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PUBLIC FUNDING FOR NONPUBLIC EDUCATION:
SCHOOL VOUCHER INITIATIVES
Kathleen G. Harris*

On June 27, 2002, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,66 the United States
Supreme Court upheld Ohio's school voucher initiative, authorizing
government aid for students in failing Cleveland public schools to
attend, upon independent parental choice, private and parochial
schools. Similar education reform initiatives may face distinct
challenges in the Commonwealth. Significantly, traditional legal
interpretation of Virginia constitutional provisions has been more
restrictive than those of federal constitutional provisions addressing
government entanglement with religion. While carefully crafted voucher
initiatives aiding sectarian private schools may pass muster under the
U.S. Constitution, application of the Commonwealth's constitutional
requirements could warranta different result.
In recent years, education reform efforts nationwide have assumed a
variety of forms, whether addressing accountability, school choice, or
charter schools. Prompting intense judicial scrutiny in recent years,
however, are those school choice initiatives-vouchers, tuition tax credits
and deductions, and tuition reimbursement programs-involving private
sectarian schools and potentially implicating federal, as well as specific
state constitutional issues, regarding the separation of church and state.
Called into question within the U.S. Constitution is the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, providing that "Congress shall make no
,,67
law respecting an establishment of religion ....

In examining challenges to state statutes, creating these various
school choice initiatives based on Establishment Clause issues, courts
continue to invoke the three-prong test ("Lemon test") articulated by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 68 To withstand
Establishment Clause scrutiny,

. Senior Attorney, Virginia Division of Legislative Services
66. 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.

68. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) [hereinafter "the Lemon test"].
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the initiative must have (i) a secular purpose, (ii) a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (iii) must not foster excessive
entanglement. 69
government
The Lemon test is the primary tool of analysis in voucher, tuition tax
credit, and tuition reimbursement cases. In 1973, the Supreme Court
used the Lemon test to overturn a New York statute reimbursing
nonpublic schools for state-mandated tests, as there was no way to
determine that the "internally prepared" tests would not be used for
religious instruction. 70 In 1975, the Court invalidated Pennsylvania's
loans of instructional materials and provision of certain auxiliary
services to nonpublic sectarian school pupils, but upheld textbook loans
for nonpublic school students as a benefit to parents and children, rather
71
than to the schools themselves.
In 1980, further refinements to the Lemon constitutional analysis
included a decision upholding the revised New York reimbursement
statute, as the reimbursement covered actual costs for state-mandated
testing in nonpublic schools; teacher-prepared tests were not
reimbursable. 72 This particular decision has been noted as significant as
the Court clearly stated that even direct aid to a sectarian institution did
73
not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause.
In 1983, the Supreme Court upheld Minnesota's tax deduction for
parents of public school students, as well as nonpublic and parochial
school students for tuition, textbook, and transportation expenses in
Mueller v. Allen. 74 In a 5-4 decision, the Court noted its "consistent
rejection of the argument that 'any program which in some manner aids
an institution with a religious affiliation' violates the Establishment
Clause," and stated that the tax deduction satisfied the "secular purpose"
prong of the Lemon test, as it plainly assisted in developing an educated
69. Id. at612.
70. Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973).
71. See Meek v. Pettenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). In 1977, however, the Court upheld Ohio's provision
of certain auxiliary services to nonpublic school students, distinguishing its decision as these services
were delivered at a neutral location under the Ohio statute, rather than at a nonpublic school, as the
Pennsylvania statute had permitted. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). However, both of these
decisions were revisited by the Court nearly a quarter of a century later and were declared
"anomalies in our case law." Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2539 (2000).
72. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
73. Id. at 657.
74. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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citizenry. 75
Subsequently invoking Lemon v. Kurtzman,7 6 the U.S. Supreme Court

construed the Establishment Clause to uphold a state vocational
scholarship used in a seminary in Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services
for the Blind;77 to support the application of federal grant moneys for a
sign language interpreter in a parochial school in Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District;7" 8 and to permit public school teachers to
provide remedial education in parochial schools in Agostini v. Felton.7 9
The Agostini decision overturned a previous injunction, upheld under
Aguilar v. Felton8° twelve years before, in finding that public school
teachers might provide federally-funded (Title I) remediation services
for private and public schools students as the initiative did not "advance
religion." 81
From the Mueller decision in 1983 until 1996, the U.S. Supreme
Court considered seventeen Establishment Clause cases. 82 In ten
decisions, the particular practice or initiative was found constitutional;
of the seventeen, six were decided by one vote. 83 It has been noted by
education law experts that "it does not appear that the Court, as an
institution, is moving in any direction. '84 This contention is borne out
in the U.S. Supreme Court's 4-2-3 decision (two justices concurring,
three dissenting) in Mitchell v. Helms, issued on June 28, 2000, in which
the Court upheld Louisiana's use of federal Chapter 2 funds (Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965) in public and private, including
parochial, schools. 85 Using the Lemon test, the Court examined whether
the statute in question had the primary effect of advancing religion, by
considering whether the statute (i) results in governmental
indoctrination; (ii) "defines its recipients by reference to religion"; or

75. Id. at 393-97.
76. Supra note 3.
77. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
78. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
79. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
80. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
81. Educational Vouchers and the Religion Clauses Under Agostini: Resurrection, Insurrection and a
New Direction,49 CASE W. RES. 747 at 748-756 (1999).
82. Julie F. Mead & Julie K. Underwood, Establishment of Religion Analysis: The Lemon Test or Just
Lemonade? 25 J. L. & EDUC. 55, 73 (Winter 1996).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 72.
85. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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(iii) "creates an excessive entanglement." 86
In examining indoctrination that is "attributable to the State and
indoctrination that is not," the Court revisited a "neutrality principle"
that considers whether the aid to a religious entity "results from the
genuinely independent and private choices of individual parents .... -"87
The Court clearly stated that no such incentive exists where "the aid is
allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor
disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and secular
beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis." 88 In addition, the Court
specifically rejected an argument that the government aid might be
"divertible" to religious purposes. 89 The Court also clearly rejected the
argument that "pervasively sectarian" schools should automatically be
excluded from government aid initiatives. 90
VOUCHER INITIATIVES

Under Lemon v. Kurtzman 91 analysis, voucher initiatives have
typically achieved mixed judicial results. At the state court level,
Florida's voucher statute was declared unconstitutional in March 2000 in
Holmes v. Bush. 92 However, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to
a challenge of the Wisconsin voucher initiative in 1998 in Jackson v.
Benson,93 thereby allowing the state Supreme Court ruling upholding the
statute, without directly ruling on the merits of the case. Finally, on June
27, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the voucher issue directly in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,94 upholding a Cleveland, Ohio, voucher
initiative.
Wisconsin
Home of the oldest state-funded voucher initiative, created in 1990,
Wisconsin limits its Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) to a

86. Id. at 808.
87. Id. at 809-10.
88. Id. at 813 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,231 (1997).
89. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 820.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 826-29.
Supra note 3.
No. CV 99-3377, 2000 WL 527694, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 2, 2000).
578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).
122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002).
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pilot project in the City of Milwaukee. 95 The MPCP permits any pupil
in grades kindergarten to twelve residing in the City to attend any
participating Milwaukee private school, free of charge, if (i) the pupil's
family income does not exceed 1.75 times the poverty level determined
pursuant to federal office of management and budget criteria; and (ii) for
the previous school year, the pupil was enrolled in Milwaukee public
schools, in a private school pursuant to the voucher initiative, in grades
K-3 in a Milwaukee private school not pursuant to a voucher, or was not
enrolled in school at all. 96 Significantly, there is no requirement in the
MPCP that participating private schools be nonsectarian. 97
Surviving a number of state constitutional challenges in the early
1990s, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the MPCP in 1998 in
Jackson v. Benson.98 Carefully dissecting Lemon v. Kurtzman9 9 and
other U.S. Supreme Court precedents, the Jackson Court found that the
MPCP did not have the primary effect of advancing religion-despite
providing aid to sectarian and nonsectarian schools-as state aid was
provided "(1) on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor
nor disfavor religion; and (2) only as a result of numerous private
choices of the individual parents of school-age children." 100 Crucial to
the Court's decision to uphold the initiative were provisions directing
payment to the parents, rather than the schools, and providing for the
selection of pupils and participating private schools on a religion-neutral
basis. 101
Having established that the MPCP passed federal constitutional
muster, the Jackson Court then addressed state constitutional
compliance and stated that "the crucial question.. .is 'not whether some
benefit accrues to a religious institution as a consequence of the
legislative program, but whether its principal or primary effect advances
religion. 10°2 Key to the Court's conclusion that the MPCP did not
violate the Wisconsin Constitution were the program's "neutrality and

95. Eric Hirsh & Shelby Samuelson, Turning Away from Public Education, ST. LEGISLATURES, Sept.
1999, at 12.
96. Michael E. Hartmann, Spitting Distance: Tents Full of Religious Schools in Choice Programs, the
Camel's Nost ofState Labor Law Application to Their Relations with Lay Faculty Members, and the First

Amendment Tether, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 553, 602 (1996-1997).
97. Id.
98. Supra note 27.
99. Supra note 3.
100. Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 617.
101. Id. at618.

102. Id. at 621 (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971).
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indirection of state aid." 10 3 In ruling that the MPCP did not "compel"
taxpayers to support religious institutions, the Court noted that
attendance at a sectarian private school is not required, but simply
remains an option for parents to choose. 10 4 In addition, an "opt out"
provision in the MPCP statute prohibited the sectarian schools from
compelling voucher students to participate in religious activities.105
After the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled the program was
constitutional, the decision was subsequently challenged. However, the
U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, thus the Wisconsin Supreme
10 6
Court's finding that the MPCP passes constitutional muster stands.
Florida
On April 30, 1999, the Florida legislature adopted the nation's first
statewide public school voucher initiative as part of a comprehensive
"A+ Plan for Education."10 7 These vouchers, or "Opportunity
Scholarships," would be available to students attending "failing" public
schools, and may be valued at more than $4,000 a year for education in
a private school; the initiative also permitted students to attend another
public school.108
In March 2000, a Florida trial court ruled that the initiative violated

103. Id.
104. Id. at623.
105. Id. In addition, the Court concluded the MIPCP complied with the state constitutional and
procedural requirements, which preclude adoption of private or local bills embracing "more than one
subject." The Court concluded that the MPCP complied with these requirements as well. The MPCP's
limitation in targeting only students in the Milwaukee school system-a seemingly "private" or "local"
purpose-was deemed germane to the legislative purpose of "an experiment intended to address a
perceived problem of inadequate educational opportunities for disadvantaged children." Jackson at
625. Because a city such as Milwaukee, with its marked "socio-economic and educational disparities"
was the "best location" to conduct such an education experiment in public education, the MPCP did not
constitute a private or local bill under the state constitution. Id. at 627. Also prompting judicial review
was the state constitution's "uniformity clause," which required the establishment of a free public
school system that "shall be as nearly uniform as practicable...." Id. The Court ruled that the MPCPs
use of tax dollars to support private schools neither rendered the participating private schools subject
to the uniformity clause, nor did it violate the uniformity clause by permitting "certain disadvantaged
children to take advantage of alternative educational opportunities...." Id. at 628. The uniformity
clause contemplates "not a ceiling but a floor upon which the legislature can build additional
opportunities for school children"; the clause did not require the state to ensure that students receive a
free uniform basic education, but rather that the state provide the opportunity. Id. at 628 (citing WIS.
CONST. art. X, § 3).
106. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1988).
107. School Reform Blooms: Review & Outlook, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1999, at A22.
108. Id.
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the Florida Constitution in Holmes v. Bush. 10 9 In October 2000, the
district court of appeals upheld the voucher initiative, concluding the
program was not "facially unconstitutional," as the trial court had found,
and that the state constitutional language ensuring the "provision for
the education of all children" did not limit the state to "a single,
specified engine, that being the public school system." 110 The court
remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of "alternative"
state constitutional claims. 1 Holmes subsequently appealed to the
Florida Supreme Court; the court declined to accept jurisdiction and
11 2
denied the petition for review.
Ohio
The Ohio voucher initiative was created on a pilot project basis. It
addressed only school districts that "are or have ever been under federal
court order requiring supervision and operational management of the
district by the state superintendent." 11 3 To date, only the Cleveland
public schools meet this description.114 The Ohio initiative provides for
a number of students from low-income families (residing in Cleveland) to
receive scholarships for attendance at alternative schools-specifically, a
"registered" private school located in Cleveland or a public school in an
adjacent school district-and for an equal number of Cleveland public
school students to receive "tutorial assistance grants." 1 5
In 1999, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the Ohio School Voucher
Program in Simmons-Harris v. Goff on federal and various state
constitutional grounds, but found the program to be in violation of state
11 6
constitutional provisions addressing certain procedural requirements.
In examining the federal Establishment Clause challenge, the Court
noted that the Cleveland voucher program did not "create an
109. Supra note 27. An appeal of this final judgment effectuated an automatic stay of the ruling
pending appellate review. A motion to vacate this automatic stay was denied on May 2, 2000, as the
court acknowledged it could only vacate a stay under "the most compelling circumstances." Id. at *1
(quoting St. Lucie v. N. Palm Dev. Corp., 444 So.2d 113, 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)). The court
specifically noted, however, that reconsideration of its final judgment was not at issue, and that its
denial of the motion to vacate did not require consideration of the appeal's likelihood of success. Id.
110. Bush v. Holmes, 767 So.2d 668, 675 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
111. Id. at677.
112. Holmes v. Bush, 790 So.2d 1104 (Fla. 2001).
113. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975(A) (Anderson 2000).
114. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 213-214 (Ohio 1999).

115. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974(F), 3313.974(G), 3313.975(A) (Anderson 2000).
116. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 207.
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unconstitutional link between the government and religion... [nor]
involve the state in religious indoctrination," and concluded that any
link between government and religion was "indirect," as government
moneys might reach sectarian schools only through the "independent
and private choices" of parents, reasoning echoed in the Jackson
decision.117
Turning to state constitutional provisions, the Court reiterated much
of its federal Establishment Clause analysis and found neither an
"impermissible legislative purpose" nor any excessive government
entanglement with religion in the Cleveland voucher program.118 The
Court was careful to note, however, that while the Cleveland voucher
program did not "undermine the state's obligation to public education"
at its current funding level, an expanded voucher initiative "could
damage public education" and "might be subject to a renewed
constitutional challenge."11 9 The Court found that the School Voucher
Program and Ohio law created "considerable disunity" in violation of the
1 20
state constitution's "one subject" rule for legislation.
Unlike the state Supreme Court, the federal district court ruled the
program did indeed violate the Establishment Clause by requiring public
support for sectarian schools.1 21 Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's 1973
decision in Nyquist,122 the federal district court noted," 'direct aid [from
states to sectarian schools] in whatever form is invalid."1 23 The
Cleveland voucher money directed to private schools was not restricted
to secular educational purposes and, therefore, arguably advanced
religion. Specifically addressing the argument that state funds are sent to
sectarian institutions only as a result of an intervening, independent
parental choice, the federal district court found that, in reality, parents
had limited choices in voucher schools.1 24 While the program permitted
the use of vouchers at public, as well as private schools, no public

117. Id. at 209. However, the Ohio Supreme Court found that the voucher admissions criterion giving
preference to students whose parents are affiliated with an organization supporting the private school
failed to satisfy the Agostini requirement that selection criteria not advance religion or encourage
parents to modify religious beliefs or practices. Id. at 209. The Court severed the offending admissions
criterion and found that the voucher program might stand without it. Id.
118. Id. at211.
119. Id. at212.
120. Id. at215.
121. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F.Supp.2d 725 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
122. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780 (1973).
123. Supra note 56, at 733.
124. Simmons-Harris, 54 F.Supp.2d at 741.
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schools had in fact registered to participate and parochial schools
dominated. 125 Thus, the court reasoned, parents did not have a
"significant choice between public and private schools. 1 26
Following a series of stays and other proceedings, the U.S. District
Court permanently enjoined the administration of the Ohio voucher
initiative in December, 1999.127 The Court focused on the fact that
vouchers were only available for schools that registered for the program,
and that the great majority of participating schools were indeed
sectarian. 128 In addition, because the application of voucher money was
unrestricted and might not be used for secular purposes, the initiative
resulted in government-sponsored indoctrination. 129 The Court rejected
the arguments that the voucher program was simply one of an array of
educational options and that students had no meaningful choice between
130
attending sectarian or nonsectarian schools.
On December 11, 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling, stating that the "alleged
choice afforded both public and private school participants in this
program is illusory" since no public schools had registered to participate,
131
and of the participating private schools, 82 percent were sectarian.
Students effectively had little choice under the program, which, the
court opined, "has the impermissible effect of promoting sectarian
schools.

' 132

On June 27, 2002, reversing the Sixth Circuit's ruling, the U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged the voucher initiative's "valid secular
purpose of providing educational assistance to poor children in a
demonstrably failing public school system" and focused instead on any
"forbidden 'effect' of prohibiting or advancing religion." 133 The Court,
in a 5-4 decision (with separate consenting opinions by two justices, and
three separate dissenting opinions, in which one, four, and three justices
aired or "joined" their views), relied heavily on case precedent
distinguishing between direct government aid to religious schools and aid
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 737.
Id.
Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F.Supp.2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
Id. at 847.
Id. at 849.
Id. at 855.
Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 959 (6th Cir. 2000).
Id.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct.2460, 2465 (2002).
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that "reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and
13 4
independent choices of private individuals."
Emphasizing "true private choice" and all educational options-not
just those available under the voucher initiative-the majority flatly
rejected arguments that the Cleveland program created a "perception"
of government endorsement of religion and that the high participation
of religious schools in practice limited parental choice. 135 Significantly,
the Court found that "[t]he constitutionality of a neutral educational aid
program simply does not turn on whether and why, in a particular area,
at a particular time, most private schools are run by religious
organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious
'136
school.
THE ZELMAN RULING: IMPLICATIONS FOR VIRGINIA

The constitutionality of school voucher initiatives in the
Commonwealth will likely hinge on the Virginia judiciary's application
of the Lemon, 137 Nyquist, 138 Mueller,139 and, of course, the Zelman
decisions. 140 While the decisions and dicta offered in other state court
cases may prove illuminating, they would certainly not be binding on a
Virginia court. Also bearing consideration is the traditional
interpretation of Virginia constitutional provisions-specifically, Article
I, § 16 (providing for free exercise of religion); 141 Article IV, § 16
(prohibiting appropriations to religious or charitable bodies); 142 and
143
Article VIII, § 10 (prohibiting aid to schools not under public control)
- by the Virginia judiciary and Attorney General as more restrictive than
those federal constitutional provisions addressing government
entanglement with religion. 144
Article I, § 16 parallels the federal Establishment and Free Exercise

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id. at2468.
Id. at2470.
Supra note 3.
Supra note 57.
Supra note 9.
Supra notes 56, 59-71.

141. VA. CONST. art. I, § 16.

142. VA. CONST. art IV, § 16
143. VA. CONST. art VIII, § 10.

144. 1994 Op. Va. Atfy Gen. 21, 24-25 (opinion to Delegate G.C. Jennings).
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Clauses of the First Amendment. 145 When examining this state
provision, the Virginia judiciary has typically mirrored the federal
reasoning in First Amendment cases. 146 It has been noted, however, that
the Virginia courts have turned to the Virginia Constitution, rather than
the federal First Amendment, more often in cases involving religious
freedom issues; the federal constitution is more frequently cited in
147
Virginia cases involving freedom of speech and press.
Article IV, § 16 prohibits the General Assembly from appropriating
funds, personal property, or real estate to "any church or sectarian
society, or any association or institution.. .which is entirely or partly,
directly or indirectly, controlled by any church or sectarian society. ' 148
This section supported the Virginia Supreme Court's 1955 decision to
strike down a tuition grants initiative, and to support loans to students
in public or private, nonsectarian institutions of higher education in
1973.149 Constitutional scholars see the section as figuring prominently,
along with Article VIII, § 10, in Virginia cases addressing "aid to
schools." 150
parochial
Finally, Article VIII, § 10 was created to generally prohibit the
151
appropriation of public funds-state or local-for nonpublic education.
As interpreted by the Virginia Supreme Court in 1955, the section was
largely designed to "prohibit... [the] diversion of public funds from the
public school system to the aid or benefit of private schools. ' 152 This
section has witnessed changes reflecting massive resistance to
desegregation and subsequent court challenges. 153 The section was cited
in 1959 in Harrison v. Day, in which the Virginia Supreme Court upheld
the authority of the legislature to make grants for students in
nonsectarian private schools, but ruled that these tuition grants could
not be funded by state dollars withheld from the closed public schools; to

145. A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 296 (1974).

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Supra note 77.

149. Almond v.Day, 89 S.E.2d 851 (1955).
150. Supra note 80, at 550-552.
151. Hullihen W. Moore, In Aid of Public Education: An Analysis of the Education Article of the
Virginia Constitution of 1971, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 263, 299-302 (1971).
152. Supra note 83, at 854.
153. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Griffin v. State Bd. Of Educ., 239 F.Supp.
560 (E.D. Va. 1965), modified, 296 F.Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969); Harrison v. Day, 106 S.E.2d 636
(1959); supranote 37, at 950-53; supranote 85, at 300-01.
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do so would violate the then-current state constitutional mandate for an
"efficient system of free public schools. ' 154
The Virginia Supreme Court revisited § 10 in 1973 in Miller v. Ayres,
determining that the section supported not only grants or loans to
undergraduates in public institutions of higher education, but also
outright, as well as conditional grants to students in nonsectarian private
schools.1 55 In 1986, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that § 10
did not require the Commonwealth to fund a disabled student's
enrollment at an out-of-state, church-affiliated school in Phan v.
Virginia.1 56 Scholars have noted that, in light of judicial precedent, § 10
could not support tuition grants at racially imbalanced or segregated
schools.1 57 However, by limiting aid to nonsectarian schools, the section
might be interpreted to apply a stricter standard for state aid to
educational institutions than might be required under the First
1 58
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF VOUCHERS IN VIRGINIA

Precedent cases, Attorney General opinions, and constitutional
scholars indicate that the Virginia Constitution "imposes greater
restrictions than the establishment clause on governmental action that
aids religion or church-sponsored education." 1 59 Therefore, carefully
crafted voucher initiatives aiding sectarian private schools may pass
muster under the U.S. Constitution, but application of the
Commonwealth's constitutional requirements could warrant a different
result.
Choosing to interpret the Virginia religious freedom statute by
standards "even stricter" than those applied to the First Amendment,
the Virginia Supreme Court struck down a provision in the 1954
Appropriation Act providing tuition vouchers for certain war orphans
enrolled in public or private institutions in Almond v. Day.1 60 Citing
federal First Amendment cases as well as § 16 (then § 67) of the Virginia

154.
155.
156.
157.

Harrison, 106 S.E.2d at 648.
198 S.E.2d 634 (1973).
806 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1986).
Supra note 80, at 954-57.

158. Id.

159. 1991 Op. Va. Atfy. Gen. 49 (opinion to Senator Richard Saslaw).
160. Supra note 83
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Constitution, the Court found the initiative unconstitutional as it
"utilizes

public

funds to

support religious institutions... [;] affords
sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for
their religious classes through use of the state's compulsory public school
machinery,..., [and] compels taxpayers to contribute money for the
propagation of religious opinions which they may not believe .... -"161 The
Court also noted the concession in the Attorney General's reply brief
that the payment of sectarian school tuition violates the state and U.S.
Constitutions, and rejected the contention that the issue was not
properly raised before the Court. 162 The Court concluded that upholding
the tuition payment initiative "would mean that by like appropriations
the General Assembly might divert public funds to the support of a
system of private schools which the Constitution now forbids. ' 163 Also
figuring prominently in the Court's ruling was the state constitutional
provision now found in Article VIII, § 10, prohibiting, with some
significant exceptions, appropriations of public funds to any school not
164
under public control.
The Virginia judiciary has not considered any similar school voucher
issues in recent years. However, in a 1994 opinion reviewing the
propriety of tuition voucher programs, the Virginia Attorney General
stated that, in creating any state policies aiding private education, the
legislature should be "cognizant of its responsibility to the public school
system and its obligation to provide a quality public education
program." 165 Citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Lemon and
Mueller, the Attorney General noted that, while government aid to
certain voucher initiatives might pass federal constitutional muster, the
Virginia Constitution places a "'higher wall'
of church/state
166
separation."
While the Attorney General found that Article VIII, § 10 of the
Virginia Constitution "did not prohibit tuition grants in furtherance of
Virginia students in... nonsectarian private school," it clearly did not
support similar aid to students in sectarian schools. ' 167 Although a
Virginia voucher initiative might have a "secular purpose" of supporting

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Almond, 89 S.E.2d at 858; supra note 80, at 302.
Id. at 856-57.
Id. at 859.
Id. at 854.
1994 Op. Va. Atfy. Gen. 21 (opinion to Delegate G.C. Jennings).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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broader educational opportunities, the Virginia Attorney General has
stated that even if a "legitimate secular purpose" has been established, an
initiative might nonetheless be unconstitutional if "in actual practice,
' 168
primarily benefited the sectarian schools.
In 1991, the Attorney General also examined Article VIII, § 10 to
conclude the provision of transportation for sectarian, as well as
nonsectarian private school students, might pass state constitutional
scrutiny if a public safety issue were demonstrated and parents bore the
full cost of the transportation. 169 The opinion also cited Article I, § 16
and Article IV, § 16 in noting the Virginia Constitution's requirement of
"governmental neutrality with respect to religion" and in stating that
the public provision of free transportation to students in sectarian
schools would clearly be unconstitutional. 7 0
In a 1995 examination of a permissive version of this "Share the
Ride" concept, the Attorney General stated the provision of public
school buses to transport private school students-sectarian and
nonsectarian-was
not
violative
of the
federal
or Virginia
Constitutions. 7 ' He further concluded that § 10 did not necessarily
prohibit the use of public funds to provide transportation to these
'1 72
students under a "child-benefit" theory "'or some other approach.'
Significantly,
the
opinion did distinguish between
providing
transportation and other "incidental" services and supporting tuition at
173
private, sectarian schools.
Although not targeting aid to nonpublic schools, the Virginia Supreme
Court has recently examined the use of state aid in capital projects for
nonpublic universities, as provided for in Virginia Code §20-30.39 et
seq., Educational Facilities Authority Act.1 74 On November 3, 2000, the
Virginia Supreme Court reviewed Article VIII, § 11 of the Virginia
Constitution, addressing state aid for nonpublic higher, not K-12,
education, and ultimately upheld the issuance by the Virginia College
Building Authority (VCBA) of bonds benefiting Regent University in
Virginia College Building Authority v. Lynn. 175 The case is instructive
168. Id.
169. Supra note 93.
170. Id.

171.
172.
173.
174.

1995 Op. Va. Atfy. Gen. 149 (1995) (opinion to Delegate Robert F. McDonnell).
Id. (citing Phan, 806 F.2d at 524).
Id. (citing Phan, 806 F.2d at 525).
Virginia Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682 (2000).

175. Id.
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not in its review of that particular constitutional provision, but in its
application of cases often included in school voucher decisions
nationwide.
The Educational Facilities Authority Act defined eligible institutions
as those "whose primary purpose is to provide collegiate or graduate
education and not to provide religious training or theological
education" 176 - language mirroring that found in Article VIII, § 11 of the
Virginia Constitution, and specifically excluded from eligible projects
those facilities to be used for "sectarian instruction or as a place of
religious worship." 177 Although explicitly finding Regent University
sectarian "in both policy and practice," 178 the Court distinguished this
characterization from its "primary purpose." 179 Also figuring
prominently in the Court's decision was the unique nature of VCBA aid;
the bond proceeds were comprised of "funds of private investors... [and
were] not governmental aid received by the institution."1 80 While ruling
Regent's participation in VCBA bond issues appropriate under state law
and the Virginia and U.S. Constitutions, the Court did, however,
necessarily exclude Regent's School of Divinity from participation.1 81
CONCLUSION
Implementation of a Zelman-style voucher initiative in the
Commonwealth may prove difficult. While the U.S. Supreme Court has
clearly approved government aid via school vouchers for students in
failing public schools to attend private and parochial schools through
independent parental choice, application of pertinent Virginia
Constitutional provisions may warrant different results in Virginia.
While the Virginia judiciary would likely weigh carefully any indirect
government aid a voucher might provide, whether the aid was restricted
to nonsectarian purposes, and the secular purpose of expanding
educational opportunities, provisions clearly prohibiting state funding
for sectarian schools, and Attorney General opinions distinguishing
incidental aid to sectarian schools, could support any decision by the

176. Id. at 687.
177. Id.

178. Id. at 689.
179. Id. at691.
180. Id. at698.
181. Id.
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Virginia judiciary-and a higher court-to prohibit a voucher initiative
benefiting sectarian schools in the Commonwealth.
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